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HousingU.S. housing accounted for over 22% of the country's total primary energy consumption in 2009, which equated to
more than $2000 per household and $229 billion in aggregate expenditure. It appears that these amounts could
be reduced substantially, with beneﬁts to both household budgets and the environment's well-being. This paper's
goal is to evaluate the alternative mechanisms that could expedite energy efﬁciency retroﬁts for U.S. housing.
Webegin by evaluating the evidence that signiﬁcant improvements in the energy efﬁciency of existing U.S. hous-
ing are feasible, both technologically and ﬁnancially. We compare the relatively optimistic positions taken in
McKinsey and Company (2009a,b), EPRI (2009), and Harcourt, Brown, and Carey (2011) versus the less optimis-
tic appraisal in Allcott and Greenstone (2012). We conclude that signiﬁcant energy savings do appear to be both
technologically and ﬁnancially feasible.
The remainder of the paper considers the bottlenecks that hamper energy-saving investments for the residential
sector. We focus on imperfect information and loan market failures as the two key factors. We evaluate the state
of the art with respect to scoring and assessment tools for energy-saving investments and the On-Bill, PACE, and
Solar programs to facilitate secured loans. The discussion concludes with a series of proposals to overcome the
bottlenecks.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
In 2009, U.S. residences accounted for over 22% of the country's total
primary energy consumption, which equated to more than $2000 per
household and $229 billion in aggregate expenditure.1 Energy use
rises with the age of the home, with homes built after 2000 using 40%
less energy than homes built before 1950. Energy efﬁciency in many
older homes could improve signiﬁcantly with upgrades to the structure
or new appliances, but many homeowners have not yet made these
investments.
This paper addresses the apparent failure of U.S. property owners to
carry out energy-saving investments in the presence of ﬁnancially
productive technologies by analyzing the impediments to improving
residential energy efﬁciency, assessing potential gains to householdsilomathia Foundation and the
omments, we thank our discus-
omber of the Harvard Business
ference “Present & Retrospect:
Malpezzi of the University of
f the paper at the 2013 ASSA
niversity of California, Berkeley,
510 643 7441.
. This is an open access article underand the economy, and evaluating policy approaches to increasing resi-
dential energy efﬁciency investments.2 We focus on the failure to retro-
ﬁt existing homes since older homes are signiﬁcantly less efﬁcient than
newly constructedhomes. Furthermore, given the low rate atwhichU.S.
homes are removed from the existing stock, these older units will con-
tinue to waste energy for decades to come unless they are retroﬁtted.
The paper's goal is then to evaluate alternative mechanisms that could
expedite energy efﬁciency retroﬁts for U.S. housing.
We begin in Sections 2 and 3 by evaluating the evidence that signiﬁ-
cant improvements in the energy efﬁciency of existing U.S. housing are
feasible, both technologically and ﬁnancially. With this basis, Section 4
of the paper discusses how property owners, and other stake holders
in the retroﬁt process, can obtain expert advice to allow informed choices
in carrying out energy-saving investments.We focus on the usability and
accuracy of computer-based audit “tools” that allow property owners to
evaluate the beneﬁts from various energy-saving investments.
Section 5 of the paper considers the ﬁnancial impediments to carry-
ing out energy-saving investments. We focus on two widely discussed
programs, namely On-Bill plans available from participating public util-
ities and Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) plans available from2 It isworth noting that this is not a newquestion; see Jaffee (1984) for an early study of
the factors that create energy-saving investments in new homes.
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Table 1
2010 residential energy by end-use.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2012).
Space heating 44.7%
Water heating 16.4%
Space cooling 9.2%
Electronics/computers 6.2%
Lighting 5.9%
Refrigeration 3.9%
Cooking 3.7%
Washers/dryers 3.3%
Other 6.7%
100.0%
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ments that could be used to ﬁnance energy-saving investments.
Section 6 concludes with our evaluation of the available policies and
other actions that could encourage energy efﬁciency. Some proposals
are intended directly to remove informational and ﬁnancial obstacles,
whereas others are intended to “nudge” households to action, for exam-
ple, by allowing the investment activity to be carried out in conjunction
with trigger events.
2. Residential energy use and potential beneﬁts of energy saving
investments
Statistics compiled by the U.S. Department of Energy (2012) on
home energy use and energy-saving investments underline the poten-
tial for energy savings:
• Almost three-quarters of residential energy goes for space and water
heating and space cooling, with the remainder primarily used by elec-
tronic appliances; see Table 1.
• Homes built between 2000 and 2009 used 15% less energy per square
foot than homes built in the 1980s, and 40% less energy than homes
built before 1950. However, these gains in efﬁciency have been partially
offset because the new homes are larger; see Table 2 for further details.
• The energy consumption per household in multi-family buildings with
ﬁve ormore units is less than half that of detached single-family homes.
On the other hand, on a square-foot basis, single-family homes aremore
efﬁcient, because they are on average about twice the size of multi-
family units; see Table 3.
• The energy efﬁciency of U.S. residences overall appears to be substan-
tially less than that of comparable buildings in Western Europe and
other developed countries, after controlling for such factors as climate,
GDP, and population.3 This suggests that practical technology does
exist to improve the energy efﬁciency of U.S. residences, although part
of this difference could also be due to the behavioral response of
European residents to higher energy prices.
These facts raise a key question: why have the investments to
achieve these energy savings not already been carried out? Carrying
out an energy-efﬁciency upgrade generally requires two fundamental
steps. The ﬁrst step is to acquire the necessary information to recognize
the overall economic feasibility and viability of energy-saving invest-
ments and to select the speciﬁc investments and contractors. The sec-
ond step is to acquire the ﬁnancial resources, normally a loan, to cover
the capital costs of the investments. A bottleneck at either step can
very well doom the entire project, since taking no action, or postponing
action is often an available option for property owners.
3. The potential beneﬁts of energy-saving investments
In a widely discussed study, McKinsey and Company (2009a)—
Unlocking Energy Efﬁciency in the U.S. Economy—evaluates the availabili-
ty of “NPV-positive” energy-saving investments for the U.S. economy,
including residential real estate, for a twelve year period running from
2008 to 2020.4 For the residential sector alone, the study projects that
a present value of $229 billion in upfront investment costs would
yield a present value of $395 billion in savings. By 2020, energy use in
the residential sector would be reduced by 28% relative to a “business3 The International Energy Agency, IEA (2004, 2008), provides comparisons of residen-
tial energy use in the U.S. and Europe corrected for climate and measured per unit of GDP
or per capita. McKinsey and Company (2007) shows similar data. Ries et al. (2009) com-
pare energy use in the U.S., Australia, and the European Union. The ACEEE (2012) report
ranks the U.S. only slightly behind the European Union in building efﬁciency, but this in-
cludes commercial buildings and “national efforts” onwhich theU.S. scores relativelywell.
4 Allcott and Greenstone (2012) provide citations to studies they consider predecessors
to McKinsey and Company (2009a).as usual” (BAU) benchmark.5 The savings and investment costs translate
into an internal return on investment (IRR) of over 19%.6 The McKinsey
report further identiﬁes themost important residential energy-saving in-
vestments, which include sealing ducts, insulating basements/attics,
upgrading heating equipment, and adding programmable thermostats.
These investments deliver the highest IRRs with the exception of the
upgrading of heating equipment. The McKinsey report also evaluates
the factors that have inhibited these investments and recommends ac-
tions that would expedite the investments. We consider these factors
and recommendations below.
The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI, 2009) carried out its
own assessment of potential U.S. energy efﬁciency over the period
2010 to 2030. The EPRI and McKinsey studies both use the U.S. Energy
Information Administration's (2008) Annual Energy Outlook to com-
pute the benchmark forecast of U.S. electricity consumption to 2020,
and they both apply a “bottom-up”methodology to compute the poten-
tial savings. While the EPRI study focuses only on electricity consump-
tion, it still provides a useful comparison for validating the McKinsey
methodology. The EPRI study does estimate a signiﬁcantly lower poten-
tial of 473 terawatt-hours (TWh) in energy savings by 2020, compared
to the McKinsey estimate of 1080 TWh. However, McKinsey and
Company (2009b) provides a useful bridge between the two studies
that accounts for the variance based on differences in the aggregate
scope and technologies considered.
Table 4 shows the key differences between the EPRI and McKinsey
studies. The largest factor is that McKinsey included: a wider range of
public infrastructure investments (street lights, water distribution and
treatment, etc.); more electronic controls and small appliances, larger
building shell measures; and a wider range of industrial processes.
The next factor is that McKinsey allows new technology to be deployed
as soon as it becomes a positive net present value investment, whereas
EPRI introduces the new technology on a slower time schedule. The
third factor is that EPRI applies a “frozen technology” standard, whereas
McKinsey uses data from the EIA's National Energy Modeling System to
factor in anticipated increases in productivity and decreases in costs.
The ﬁnal factor is that EPRI uses a lower discount rate (5% versus 7%
forMcKinsey) and lower energy rates,which lead to higher EPRI savings
estimates. In our opinion, the EPRI study provides a useful and success-
ful robustness check for the McKinsey method and conclusions. It
should be noted, however, that both the EPRI study and the McKinsey
report were published in 2009, at a time when energy prices were
historically high. The future trajectory of energy prices will evidently
play a critical role in the incentive structure and regulatory response to
energy efﬁciency related issues. Lower (higher) future energy prices
would generate lesser (greater) push for energy efﬁciency investments.
Indeed, several articles emphasize the vulnerability of point-in-time5 The BAU benchmark is based on the Energy Information Administration's National En-
ergy Modeling System and Annual Energy Outlook 2008.
6 To compute the IRR, we ﬁrst translated the $395 billion present value of savings into
an equivalent constant annual ﬂow of $49.7 billion based on the 12 year horizon and
McKinsey's assumed 7% discount rate. The IRR is then computed based on the $229 billion
present value of the investment and the $49.7 billion annual savings.
Table 2
Delivered energy, by vintage of residence, as of 2009.
Source: EIA (2012), 2009 RECS Preliminary Consumption and Expenditure Tables.
Per square foot Per household Per household member Total # of housing units
Year built (thousand Btu) (million Btu) (million Btu) (millions)
Before 1940 51.7 110.2 45.6 14.4
1940 to 1949 52.0 96.8 36.4 5.2
1950 to 1959 52.6 97.1 38.1 13.5
1960 to 1969 50.2 87.9 35.8 13.3
1970 to 1979 46.9 79.0 31.2 18.3
1980 to 1989 43.5 77.0 30.7 17.0
1990 to 1999 39.8 87.7 33.0 16.4
2000 to 2009 37.1 91.4 32.4 15.6
Table 3
Delivered energy, by building type, as of 2009.
Source: EIA (2012), 2009 RECS Preliminary Consumption and Expenditure Tables.
Per square foot Per household Per household member Total # of housing units
Building type (thousand Btu) (million Btu) (million Btu) (millions)
Single family 42.8 103.6 37.7 78.6
Detached 42.6 105.7 38.0 71.8
Attached 46.0 81.3 33.0 6.7
Multi-family 60.1 55.9 27.2 28.1
2 to 4 units 69.2 76.1 32.8 9
5+ units 54.6 46.4 4.0 19.1
Mobile homes 62.4 67.8 25.8 6.9
47A. Bardhan et al. / Regional Science and Urban Economics 47 (2014) 45–60saving estimates to lower energy prices (Palmer et al., 2012, Gillingham
et al., 2006, 2009).
Signiﬁcant research has also focused on the potential for energy-
saving investments within the state of California. California has received
special attention due to its large share of U.S. energy consumption, as
well as the variety of innovative energy-saving initiatives created by
California governments at all levels. The most detailed study, conducted
byHarcourt, Brown, and Carey (HBC, 2011) under the sponsorship of the
California Public Utilities Commission, analyzes the potential for energy-
saving investments in California, concluding that a typical energy efﬁ-
ciency retroﬁt would achieve energy reductions of 20 to 25% in single
family homes at investment costs ranging from $7200 to $15,000 per
home. The HBC results for California appear generally consistent with
theMcKinsey and Company (2009a) study for the U.S. as awhole. A larg-
er part of the HBC study is then focused on explaining why such produc-
tive investments have not been carried out, a topic to which we return
below; see also Bamberger (2012) for policies to expedite energy efﬁ-
ciency investments in California.
In contrast to the above studies, Allcott and Greenstone (2012), in a
recent survey paper, provide a less optimistic appraisal for the effective-
ness of energy saving investments, concluding “it is difﬁcult to substan-
tiate claims of a pervasive Energy Efﬁciency Gap.” They are particularly
dismissive of “the massive potential savings calculated in engineering
analyses such as McKinsey & Co.” Their key complaint is that studiesTable 4
Comparison of McKinsey and Company (2009a) and EPRI (2009) studies.
Source: McKinsey and Company (2009b). TWh = terawatt hours.
Factor of comparison McKinsey increment in
energy savings
McKinsey allows greater scope of
end-uses of energy
490 TWh
McKinsey allows accelerated
deployment of new technology
180 TWh
McKinsey assumes advances in
technology over time
60 TWh
EPRI uses lower discount rate
and energy retail rates
−120 TWh
Total 610 TWhin support of energy savings, such as from the Weatherization Assis-
tance Program and public utility programs, exaggerate the beneﬁts be-
cause they fail to consider “unobserved factors.” Their paper examines
a few different possible causes of the energy gap and ﬁnds no measur-
able evidence of a large gap. They conclude that where savings exist,
they are smaller than calculated through engineering studies. They
add that heterogeneity in consumers and circumstances dictates that
policies should be targeted to situations where the greatest gains are
likely (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012, p. 5).
Gillingham and Palmer (2013) emphasize the breadth of factors that
contribute to the ambiguity of evaluating the energy gap. They present
arguments that engineering estimates may be overoptimistic as the
result of hidden costs, heterogeneous customer situations, imperfect
investment installation and maintenance, and the impact of risk and
uncertainty on the decision (related to large ﬁxed investments in a
worldwithﬂuctuating energy prices). They also note that, beyond infor-
mation and credit access barriers, behavioral anomalies may create
suboptimal energy efﬁciency investments, thus creating potential bene-
ﬁts for a “nudging” approach to mitigate the behavioral factors.
Amain conclusion of theseworks is that policy actions are constrained
because we still have a limited understanding of how the behavioral re-
sponses of individual homeowners affect their energy efﬁciency deci-
sions. In contrast, in our opinion (and as documented in the following
sections), informational obstacles and credit access barriers are clearly ev-
ident as observablemarket failures that inhibit energy-saving investments.
Mitigating these market failures thus provides a critical next step for ef-
fective public policy.7 Nevertheless, we agreewith Allcott andGreenstone
that the appropriate policy will depend on the form of themarket failure,
and we consider their views on this topic in the following sections.
4. Informational obstacles to energy-saving investments in
residential properties
Information is an essential input to implement an energy-saving
investment if the property owner is to recognize and select productive7 Nadel and Langer (2012) also provide a critique of the Allcott and Greenstone (2012)
paper, although based on a different set of factors.
Existing 
Conditions
Appliances
• type
• age
• condition
Utility bill
• rates
• time of use
Home
• size
• age
• condition
Demographics
• HH size
• HH age mix
• income
• behavior
Comfort level
•heating
•cooling
Investment 
Decision
Triggers
• Major Repair
• Home purchase/sale
• Renovation
• Rate change
• Climate change
Energy Information
• Usage
• Cost
• HH comparisons
• Appliance comparisons
Finance Information
• Incentives
• Eligibility
• Interest rates
Geography
and climate
Source: Authors
Fig. 1. Residential energy efﬁciency investment decision process.
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since lenderswill generally require evidence that the investment is pro-
ductive. Signiﬁcant informational issues arise in choosing energy-saving
investments because the production function throughwhich homes gen-
erate housing services can be remarkably complex and opaque to most
property owners. In particular, as shown earlier in Table 1, signiﬁcant
energy use arises in at least three different home systems: (1) heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), (2) sealing and insulation,
and (3) electric appliances. These systems also interact, so the impact
on the ﬁnal energy bill and home comfort will generally not be the
sum of the parts. For example, an investment in an improved HVAC sys-
tem would likely reduce the return to improved sealing and insulation,
and vice versa. Furthermore, there could be tradeoffs between lower en-
ergy costs and home comfort. Thus, an effective energy-saving invest-
ment plan should consider all major systems simultaneously.
Property owners, of course, do have on-the-spot mechanisms to
change the home comfort level and energy bill. For example, lowering
the thermostat to reduce winter heating will dependably achieve a
lower energy bill, albeit with a cooler and potentially less comfortable
home temperature. However, when it comes to changing the main
operating systems through energy-saving investments, most property
owners have little if any experience. While they can reasonably antici-
pate that the energy bill will fall if they improve the insulation or
upgrade to energy-efﬁcient appliances, they will generally not know if
the beneﬁts are worth the investment cost.
The typical property owner will thus require expert advice if she is to
carry out energy-saving investments that are both technologically and ﬁ-
nancially efﬁcient. Fig. 1 shows the major components of the decision-
making process. High energy costs are an immediate trigger to motivate
energy-saving investments. Home structure/design, geography and
climate, as well as idiosyncratic behavioral household characteristics
(including desired comfort level), then determine the appropriate in-
vestments. Since the very process of considering the alternatives and
committing to a speciﬁc action may be unpleasant and create disutility,
further triggers may still be needed before the energy-saving invest-
ment is made.
4.1. Energy efﬁciency, audit tools and the property owner
A variety of tools have been developed over the past decade to help
the property owner sort through the decision-making complexities of
energy-saving investments. Tools can be separated into two broad
categories: scoring (e.g., ranking tools such as the EPA Home EnergyYardstick), and assessments of potential savings (e.g., audit tools to
determine potential upgrade savings). Scoring is particularly valuable
for recognizing if there is a potential gain from action. Assessment
tools, on the other hand, allow property owners to evaluate alternative
energy-saving investment savings and costs.
Table 5 provides an illustrative list of tools. Studies byKimet al. (2009)
and Sentech, Inc. (2010), in combination, identify and categorize 60 dif-
ferent building energy analysis tools, 22 of which are designed primarily
for single family residences. The level of sophistication and required in-
puts of these tools vary substantially. The great majority distinguish
among areas by climate, while other required information varies from
very basic (for four of the tools) to highly detailed data input (for ﬁve
tools). Some models allow the user to choose the level of data detail.
Fewer than half of themodelsmake use of existing information on energy
use in the home (fromutility bills, for example). Severalmodels provide a
score or rating, and the majority provide some recommendations for
action.
With this abundant choice of tools, a property owner may suffer not
so much from too little information on potential beneﬁts of retroﬁtting
as froma confusing array of information options. Our next step is to clar-
ify how these toolswork at different levels by describing inmore detail a
representative sample of energy audit tools, illustrating the ease or
complexity of use, information inputs, and outputs. We then turn to
the issue of accuracy and reliability—is this information truly useful to
the property owner inmaking an energy efﬁciency investment decision,
and how does accuracy affect the decision process?4.2. User paths for audit tools
As described above, a property owner (or in some cases a renter)
may pursue one of three paths to gain information on home energy
efﬁciency and retroﬁt options. First, the property owner may directly
access a tool (most often on-line, but computer software and hard-
copy check sheets are also available). Second, the property owner may
use tools provided by a utility company. Third, the property owner
may go directly to a contractor, who in many cases will use an audit
tool to provide more information as well as a cost estimate. These
three paths are not mutually exclusive. In addition, the tools are not
necessarily exclusively the product of a single entity. Often a strong
set of engineeringmeasures will be pairedwith aweb or wireless appli-
cation interface developed independently to make a product usable for
individuals, utilities, or contractors; see Mills and Mathew (2012). We
Table 5
Examples of residential energy efﬁciency tools.
Source: Authors from Kim et al. (2009), Sentech, Inc. (2010), and individual tool websites.
Tool Organization For whom Data required Scoring/benchmark Assessment/recommendations Review source
Energy Star Home Energy Yardstick U.S. EPA and DOE Home-owner Basic Yes Limited SEEC
Home Energy Saver (HES)a Lawrence Berkeley
National Lab
Home-owner Basic to detailed Yes Detailed alternatives and savings Both
National Energy Audit Tool (NEAT) Oak Ridge National
Laboratory
Results aimed at state
agencies, utilities
Medium No Detailed alternatives and savings.
Focus on weatherization
Both
REM/Rate Architectural Energy
Corporation (2012)
Auditors, other
organizations
required to use HERS
Basic to detailed Yes Advice on speciﬁc features;
mortgage report, appraisal
addendum
Both
Targeted Retroﬁt Energy Analysis
Tool (TREAT)
Performance Systems
Development
Auditors, utilities, state
and local agencies
Detailed No Detailed alternatives and savings
based on HERS framework.
Both
Home Energy Efﬁciency Survey Southern California
Edison (2012)
SCE customers Basic Yes Limited; with energy saving tips
tailored to household
SEEC
a Also available in a professional form (HESPro) for contractors.
49A. Bardhan et al. / Regional Science and Urban Economics 47 (2014) 45–60describe examples of how tools along each of these paths are used and
what may be learned from them.
4.2.1. Path 1: Tools for the individual property owner (engagement tools)
Many tools are freely available from publicly supported sources and
require no specialized knowledge. The range of required inputs varies
widely, as does the tool output. The two examples described here repre-
sent the two ends of the spectrum.
4.2.1.1. EPA yardstick. The EPA yardstick is one of the simplest and most
accessible of the energy efﬁciency on-line tools, ranking individual
household energy use taking into account square footage and location.8
Input for the model includes energy/fuel type, fuel usage, geographic
location (zip code), house square footage, and number of occupants;
see Fig. 2. The initial results include a “yardstick” that compares the
home's energy use to the average home (with 5 out of 10 being the aver-
age home). The results also provide simple “what if” scenarios, showing
how the yardstick changes with different types of appliances. To go
further, users are referred to “home energy professionals.”
4.2.1.2. Home Energy Saver (HES). Home Energy Saver (HES) is a
website-based, interactive tool developed by the Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory. LBNL has also created a more detailed assessment
tool for professionals (HESPro) as well as the Home Energy Scoring
Tool available on the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) (2012) website,
for asset rating.9 HES is based on a physics/engineering/energy simula-
tion model that allows the user to input home parameters at differing
levels of detail.10 Parameter inputs include home location (for climate),
home structure (size, insulation, heating and cooling, age, occupants),
and micro-foundations (windows, lighting, appliances, thermostat).
With the stepwise interactive structure, the user can choose to expand
the input details and reﬁne the results. Wherever the user has not
included actual house and appliance characteristics, the system enters
default values based on aggregate assumptions. Tool output includes:
a) Estimated energy cost,
b) The potential savings of upgrades (including reductions in CO2
emissions),
c) The cost to carry out the upgrades,11
d) Payback times and return on investment for recommended upgrades.8 The yardstick is accessed at: https://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=
HOME_ENERGY_YARDSTICK.showGetStarted.
9 See Bourassa et al. (2012) for a full description of the Home Energy Scoring Tool. The
tool can be found at http://homeenergyscore.lbl.gov.
10 An alternative approach would be to build the model from parameters based on re-
gression analysis that looks at utility bills as a function of building attributes, appliance fea-
tures and usage, climate, household demographics, and behavioral elements.
11 Retroﬁt costs, including labor/installation costs, are largely derived from the National
Residential Efﬁciency Measures Database; see http://www.nrel.gov/ap/retroﬁts/measures.
cfm?gId=5&ctId=30http://www1.eere.energy.gov/calculators/homes.html.The on-line program is relatively easy to use. At any point, the user
can ask for a calculation, which provides estimates of upgrade costs and
savings (Fig. 3).
4.2.2. Path 2: Customer engagement tools through utility companies
Given the high costs of building new generation plants, utilities may
have a strong incentive to help their ratepayers reduce the demand,
although themagnitude of this incentivemay be increased or diminished
by regulatory policies that affect ﬁnancial prospects of utilities (see Chu
and Sappington, 2012 for a discussion of the regulatory role). Many util-
ities have histories of offering energy assessments to property owners
and partnering with public sector programs to offer property owners in-
centives to invest in energy efﬁciency upgrades. Companies may offer
web sites with information on speciﬁc upgrades as well as interactive
web portals or tools that encourage the property owner or resident to
begin exploring possible ways of reducing energy use.
As an example, San Diego Gas and Electric Company (SDG&E, a part
of Sempra)makes a Home Energy Survey available to its customers. The
customer logs in and provides house details on square footage, major
energy using appliances, home age, and primary heating fuel; see
Sempra (2012). The site produces a report that includes an overall esti-
mate of energy use based on internal-to-the-company records of energy
use at the address, as well as a scoring in comparison with like proper-
ties. The site also allows the customer to choose energy efﬁciency ac-
tions and provides the savings from those actions, but without
estimates of the costs to undertake those investments (see Fig. 4).
The SDG&E site is comprehensive, addressing energy use, improve-
ments, and carbon emissions. Many utilities take less comprehensive
approaches. For example, Paciﬁc Gas and Electric (PG&E) provides links
to an appliance calculator, a carbon footprint calculator, and a general
site describing ways to save energy. Much of PG&E's consumer engage-
ment relates to action plans (for example, setting an energy reduction
goal, reducing the temperature of water used in the clothes washer,
etc.) Tool output is provided formany different individual options, rather
than for a consolidated plan of action.
4.2.3. Path 3: Tools for contractors
Certiﬁcation is a primary distinguishing feature of tools for contrac-
tors. For example, the state of California certiﬁes energy audit tools,with
the state entity CalCERTS effectively acting as a gatekeeper.12 The
California Energy Commission has developed the Home Energy Rating
System (HERS) to rate homes in California; see http://www.energy.ca.
gov/HERS. Other tools based on different HERS standards are in use12 See https://www.calcerts.com/About_Us.cfm. In addition, through CalCERTS, the state
has developed its own software.
13 From printed material provided by Andrew Healy of CakeSystems.
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Source: Authors from tool accessed at  
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=home_improvement.hm_improvement_index_tools
Fig. 2. EPA Home Energy Yardstick.
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for assessments related to weatherization programs; see Oakridge
National Laboratory, 2012. Furthermore, tool providers may require
that users have certiﬁed builder qualiﬁcations before providing access
to the tool.
We now describe two tools designed for contractors, namely TREAT
and CakeSystems. TREAT is a DOE approved plan which was reviewed
by both SEEC and Sentech and has an accessible description on the
web. CakeSystems is designed to require less complex inputs, and its
underlying energy model, SIMPLE, has been identiﬁed in studies
discussed later in this paper as having a high level of accuracy.
4.2.3.1. TREAT. The Targeted Retroﬁt Energy Analysis Tool (TREAT) is a
computer software package that is promoted as “the only energy audit
software approved by theDOE for all residential housing types—including
multifamily;” see PSD Consulting, 2012. There is a cost of several hundred
dollars to purchase the software, but there are no training or licensing re-
quirements, and training modules are provided. Specialized measure-
ment equipment is needed to fully implement the tool. Model inputs
are summarized in Fig. 5. Applying baseline customer and buildinginformation, the model will estimate energy use, but it is also possible
to reconcile the results with actual usage data. If the user selects the spe-
ciﬁc improvements to be assessed, the model will then produce a re-
port of proposed energy efﬁciency improvements and payback
period.
4.2.3.2. CakeSystems. CakeSystems (earlier known as the Energy
Performance Score software platform or EPS) is based on the SIMPLE al-
gorithms thatwere developed by a nationally recognized energy expert,
Michael Blasnik, in conjunction with Earth Advantage Institute in Ore-
gon. Detailed documentation of the tool is not available, but according
to the company material, “SIMPLE is a heat loss model utilizing best
practices for considerations such asmodelingduct loss regain and air in-
ﬁltration […] trued up using empirical data.”13 The CakeSystems tool is
nowused primarily in partnerships between a utility company and indi-
vidual contractors to assess the potential for energy efﬁciency improve-
ments in the home.
Fuels
• heating
• water
Home structure
• stories
• bedrooms
• wall color
• roof color
• attic
• foundation
• dimensions
Behavioral
• # occupants
• space usage
Energy Information Output—
• Estimated energy usage
• Improvements costs
• Expected usage
• Costs and expected payback
Weather 
location
Home surface
• materials 
• air leakage
• shielding
• insulation
• windows
• orientation
Billing analysis
Source: Authors from http://www.psdconsulting.com/sites/www.psdconsulting.com/ 
files/emodules/Intro%20to%20TREAT/Intro%20to%20TREAT.html
Features
• HVAC
• thermostat
• water heater
• lighting
Proposed
improvements 
and expected
results.
Fig. 5. TREAT.
Appliances
• type
• age
Home
• age
• sq ft
Demographics
• HH occupants by age
Energy Information Output—
• Daily energy use for month
• Cost by purpose
• Neighborhood comparison
• Savings with what-if upgrades
Climate—
based on 
local area
Major fuel
types
Source: Authors from tool accessed at http://www.sdge.com/residential
Fig. 4. San Diego Gas & Electric.
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a full service package or individually; see CakeSystems, 2012. The core
audit module (used for energy assessment in the home) requires
CakeSystems training which is available only to users with building sci-
ence credentials such as BPI certiﬁcation. Inputs require data ranging
from simple information on appliance and fuel types to measurement
of air leakage, which requires specialized equipment used by trained
personnel. The tool uses no occupant behavior inputs. See Fig. 6.
Each potential problem area is noted and rated on a scale from very
poor to excellent. The software user can enter potential improvement
measures (for example, existing incandescent light bulbswhere compact
ﬂorescent light (CFL) bulbs would be an option—see gray box in dia-
gram) and can select the best mix of improvements from a list of recom-
mendations, based on the auditor's professional judgment. The ﬁnal
report provides estimated energy savings (in kWh and dollars) andreduction in carbon output and compares results to a scale showing
the state's average and goals.
CakeSystems has two othermodules. The HOMEPortal is an interface
designed to guide the homeowner, step-by-step, through the audit-to-
retroﬁt process. The portal is customized tomeet the goals of the service
provider (for example, introducing the homeowner to energy efﬁciency
programs offered by a utility company, or linking the homeowner to an
engagement tool and/or a contractor). The ﬁnal module, the Proposal
Generator, allows home performance contractors to present the speciﬁc
cost and expected savings of different upgrade packages.
4.2.4. Impact of audit tools
A survey of energy auditors (Palmer et al., 2013) found that audits
were used by a very small share of the market at the time of the
study, perhaps between one and ﬁve percent. Company respondents
Home Characteristics
• Year built
• Address
• Area/volumes
• Bedrooms
• Window type etc.
• Foundation
• Insulation
• Leakage
Appliances
• Water heater
• Refrigerator
• Washing machine
• Dryer
• Cooking fuel
• Light bulbs
HVAC
• Area covered
• Fuel
• Type
• A/C SEER
• Ducts
I. Audit Module
• Energy use
• Energy costs
• EPS energy score
• EPS carbon score
Contractor Input
Source: Authors from demonstration model of CAKE tool.
II. Proposal Generator
• Proposed improvements
• Energy savings
III. Home Portal
• Provider customized
• Incentive information
• Links to resources
Potential Improvements
• Air leakage
• Ceiling and Attic
• Ducts
• Walls
• Floors and Walls
• Windows
• Water heating
• Lights and appliances
• Heating
• Cooling
Fig. 6. CakeSystems.
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audits or did not understandwhat an audit could provide. Formany, the
cost of an audit was a barrier to getting the information, and for those
who paid for the audit, costs were an important factor in determining
which retroﬁts would be implemented.
4.2.5. Potential stumbling blocks
The paths described here and the tools within them can be inﬂuen-
tial in leading homeowners to energy retroﬁts. However, at least three
issues arise once a proposal is in hand. First, we must ask if the tools
are dependable. Is the information generated reliable enough for the
property owner to make a retroﬁt decision and for a lender to choose
to provide ﬁnancing? Second, once a set of changes is identiﬁed, the
property owner or renter may then need to take action in multiple di-
rections, because the saving actions (new appliances, home structural
changes, household equipment) generally cannot be accomplished by
one provider. Third, due to the idiosyncratic features of individual
homes and/or occupants, the effectiveness of any particular energy efﬁ-
ciency investment may vary widely, even among apparently similar
homes. Behavioral elements embedded in the tool can signiﬁcantly
reduce the variance, but also may make the results less generally appli-
cable as a way of estimating advantages from a type of improvement.
In the next section, we review the debate concerning tool accuracy
and discuss our reasons for relying on the HES tool for our analysis.
4.3. Review of the accuracy and reliability of energy audit tools
The accuracy, internal consistency, and reliability of these energy
audit tools are critical if they are to be useful in the decision-making
and ﬁnancing steps for energy-saving investments.14 However, given
the range and complexity of the tools on offer, and many confounding
behavioral, idiosyncratic, household responses, it is not a trivial task to
compare them or evaluate their accuracy.14 The importance of transparency and accuracy in ﬁguring out the component costs of
individual end-uses in a utility bill is nicely illustrated by Brown (2001). As she argues,
“For example, residential consumers get a monthly electricity bill that provides no break-
down of individual end-uses. This is analogous to shopping in a supermarket that has no
product prices; if you get only a total bill at the checkout counter, you have no idea what
individual items cost. Supermarkets, of course, have copious price labeling; household
utility bills, in contrast, do not.”The tools all apply simulation software models based on energy
physics and engineering relationships. The more advanced tools have
detailed interactive components that help gauge behavioral issues, as
well as allowing more detailed technical inputs. Behavioral elements
include the temperature setting for the heating and cooling equipment,
computer and appliance use, etc. Detailed technical inputs include pa-
rameters such as the efﬁciencymetrics of HVAC systems and appliances
and the effectiveness of insulation and sealing.
The level of complexity in terms of detailed, customized, inputs
and outputs varies with model purpose. Models built for designers
are much more complex and focus particularly on structural ele-
ments, while the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory's (LBNL)
(2012) Home Energy Saver (HES), designed for homeowner use,
allows alternative levels of input detail, for both technical data and
behavioral factors. Models built for energy audits by contractors
are not necessarily more complex than homeowner-orientedmodels
(in fact some have a simpler underlying design), but may require
specialized equipment to make more accurate measures of factors
such as air ﬂow through the house.
We reviewed the accuracy and credibility of the energy audit tools
and models based on several factors. The literature (e.g., Earth
Advantage Institute and Conservation Services Group, 2009; Sentech,
Inc., 2010; Polly et al., 2011a) deﬁnes predictive accuracy in terms of
the ex-ante energy consumption predictions of these tools relative to
actual utility bill data.15 The models generate energy bill predictions
based on technical and behavioral user inputs, default assumptions in
case of missing inputs, climatic assumptions based on location, and
costs from various databases. The predictive accuracy is therefore a
function of the accuracy of all these individual elements. The models
also generate retroﬁt costs and corresponding savings. Therefore, pre-
dictive accuracy involves both the ex-ante bill prediction, as well as
the savings generated between pre- and post-retroﬁt bills.
We also take into accountwhether themodel is transparent in terms
of displaying its internal structure, its default assumptions, and the path
from input to outputs. It is also important to give weight to responsive-
ness and revisions based on new data, identiﬁed bugs, and user15 An alternative criterion would judgemodel accuracy in terms of the predicted change
in usage from a retroﬁt relative to the actual change. For this measure to be operational, a
control for the behavioral responses of the residents would be necessary.
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element that will have a bearing on accuracy. Our evaluation also
relies on assessments by peer reviewers with greater engineering
background than we have, and on interviews and conversations
with energy professionals to gauge the credibility and predictive
accuracy of these models.
Several studies have analyzed the predictive accuracy of tools.
Earth Advantage Institute and Conservation Services Group (2009)
reviewed the accuracy and reliability of a range of models using a
metric similar to the “miles per gallon” measure for cars, to com-
pare energy efﬁciency among homes for a standard usage pattern.
With that objective in mind, they reviewed over 100 software
models, and selected four, two based on Home Energy Saver
(demanding two different levels of inputs—HES-Mid and HES-Full,
which they refer to as the “most complete level of HES”), a model
which they call “SIMPLE” (later developed into the EPS Auditor
Pro), and REM/Rate, a widely used HERS (Home Energy Rating
System) accredited model. The results are summarized in Table 6.
The developers of the HES model contested the methodology of
the Earth Advantage study and the accuracy of its results (Mills and
Parker, 2012). Parker et al. (2012), in a paper discussing accuracy
of the HESmodel, identify some of the hazards of comparisons across
models, including reliance on default settings rather than known
conditions, inconsistent weather normalization methods, and reli-
ance on absolute values of errors and average outcomes. Their
comparison of the results of a single assessment model over different
locations and using different degrees of detailed inputs reached quite
a different conclusion from Earth Advantage Institute and Conservation
Services Group, 2009. While Earth Advantage concluded that simpler
models are as accurate as more expensive, complex ones, Parker et al.
ﬁnd in comparing predicted and actual savings, that greater detail pro-
duces greater accuracy, and that the “value” of this accuracy compared
to the time required to create the more detailed result depends on the
purpose of the evaluation.
The Sentech study cited in Section 4.1 reviews several tools that
evaluate single-family residential buildings. The primary conclusion of
this study is that, “no one tool fully captures all the characteristics
currently thought to be important to a national home performance
assessment program: low cost, universal availability, ease of use with
reasonable input requirements, conformance to a universally accepted
accuracy standard, and the ability to generate improvement recommen-
dations and associated costs.”
While Polly et al. (2011a) do not review tools individually, they
develop a methodology for improving the accuracy of simulation
tools through improved data collection procedures, simulation
protocols (default assumptions), and testing procedures. They note that
there is a perception that tools over-predict, due to faulty inputs
and software deﬁciencies (as well as complex interactive elements
in an individual house), but also because behavioral responses are
probably underestimated. Relying on categories developed by JudkoffTable 6
Energy performance score report 2009, total energy (MBtu) for 190 homes.
Source: Earth Advantage Institute and Conservation Services Group (2009, Table 3.5).
REM/rate SIMPLE HES-Mid HES-Full
Mean actual use 101 101 101 101
Mean predicted use 133 84 157 119
Mean error 32 −17 48 18
Mean absolute error 37 27 75 28
Median absolute error 31 21 66 23
Mean absolute percent error 43.7% 25.1% 96.6% 33.4%
Median absolute percent error 31.1% 24.0% 73.8% 21.8%
Percent of homes with accurate
prediction (less than +/−25%)
43.2% 51.6% 19.5% 53.7%
Percent of homes with large error in
prediction (larger than =/−50%)
31.6% 7.9% 60.5% 21.6%
Note: absolute signifying no distinction between +ve error or−ve error.and Neymark (2006) and Berry and Gettings (1998), Polly et al.
(2011a) identify the following groups where errors and inaccuracies
can creep in: a) Structural Inputs, b) Occupant Behavioral Inputs, c) Geo-
graphic Inputs, and d) Software and Coding Errors.
The predictive accuracy issue and comparability of tools is also
analyzed by Holladay (2012) in a meta-review. The study notes that
the inaccuracies of these models may relate to incomplete information
concerning idiosyncratic behavior (the missing variable in the models)
of households/consumers. The author also references ﬁve studies that
found that the measured savings from retroﬁt work equal 50% to 70%
of predicted savings.
The jury is still out concerningmodel accuracy, but the facts aremuch
clearer on other attributes such as accessibility, the transparency of the
model structure, and updating. The EPS Auditor Pro (now CakeSystems,
described in Section 4.2), for example, is accessible only by certiﬁed BPI
analysts who then need to complete a multistage training program that
includes a 5-hour online class, a 3-hour Webinar, and a ﬁnal exam.
Many models have other barriers in terms of user-friendliness, accessi-
bility, transparency, and required equipment. This is why many of
the major recent policy-oriented studies rely on the HES tool created
by LBNL, which the McKinsey and Company (2009a) Report rates
positively on those attributes.
The LBNL HES model has the advantage that it is well calibrated
in terms of engineering data and is continuously updated. It also has
options to add data on behavioral aspects, such as the detailed tempera-
ture settings of the thermostat. Furthermore, the LBNL model is quite
transparent—the inputs are documented and easily available on the
web, as are all their data sources and methodology. It is also completely
transparent in an operational sense, i.e., the user receives detailed savings
estimates based on precise inputs, allowing users to evaluate alternative
assumptions. In view of these attributes, we use the HES tool in the next
section where we carry out a NPV ranking and benchmarking exercise
of individual retroﬁt elements.
Overall, it is clear that muchmore remains to be done to improve the
accuracy of these tools. Since a signiﬁcant source of inaccuracymaybe be-
havioral/idiosyncratic factors that are very difﬁcult to calibrate, it is also
necessary to carry out randomized controlled experiments and surveys
of households, both those carrying out retroﬁts and those that are not.
The need for greater efforts in this direction is being increasingly recog-
nized. For example, Polly et al. (2011b) note “efforts continue at NREL
(National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2012) to assess and improve
the accuracy of analysis tools by developing new and improved models
and validating software predictions against measured data.” They go on
to say, “Energy use and savings predictions in this and future studies
should be compared to measured use and savings from laboratory tests,
ﬁeld tests, and pre- and post-retroﬁt utility bill analysis.”4.4. NPV ranking and benchmarking exercise
We now employ the HESPro model to rank the productivity of
individual energy retroﬁt elements. To conduct this exercise, ﬁve cities
were chosen from around the country—San Francisco, Denver, Houston,
Miami and Boston. Since HESPro works on zip codes, we chose a repre-
sentative zip code with a sizeable resident population from each urban
area.We chose theQuick Input format of theHESPro tool since it provides
default inputs for a “typical house”, including the year of construction and
whether it has an air conditioner.16 However, as shown in Table 7, we
overrode the defaults to standardize certain housing characteristics
across the cities, including size/dimensions, occupancy, and year of
construction. The HESPro model then calculated the annual energy con-
sumption for our standardized house in each of the cities, measured in
kilowatt hours (Electricity), therms (Gas), and dollar amounts.16 For example, the default year of construction in San Francisco is 1968, whereas in
Miami it is 1975.
Table 7
Standardized housing and energy characteristics across cities.
Characteristic Standardized assumption
Year built 1968
Number of adults 14–64 2
Number of children, 6–13 1
Stories in structure 1
Square footage 1800
Dimensions 72 ft by 36 ft
Foundation type Slab on grade
Roof insulation R-0
Ceiling insulation R-11
Attic type Unconditioned attic
Wall insulation Don't know/no
Thermal distribution Insulated ducts
Windows Double pane clear
aluminum
Water heater 40 gal/natural gas
Heating equipment Central gas
Boiler pipe insulation None
Cooling equipment Central AC
Refrigerator 1
Clothes washer Yes
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yearly savings and costs for each speciﬁc retroﬁt. The costs are calculat-
ed on the basis of two types of upgrades. For the case of purchasing ap-
pliances, the savings/returns calculations are based on themarginal cost
of an efﬁcient appliance over and above the cost of an inefﬁcient one.
This method will underestimate the actual cost when an appliance has
many more years of useful life. On the other hand, when an upgrade
does not involve replacing an existing feature, for example sealing
ducts and air leaks, or insulating the attic or walls, the total cost of the
retroﬁt is calculated.
Using themodel's cost estimates and annual energy savings for indi-
vidual retroﬁt measures, we generated a ranking of savings–cost ratios
across the ﬁve cities (see Fig. 7A to E).17 In addition to identifying the
retroﬁt measures with the highest returns, the results also serve as a
robustness check on the internal consistency of the model. The invest-
mentswith the highest returns are similar across the country and include
installing and using programmable thermostats, compact ﬂuorescent
lights (CFLs) in high-use ﬁxtures, and Energy Star appliances.
There are of course climatic variations. Reducing air leakage through
improved sealing and insulation has particularly high returns in colder
climates, such as Boston and Denver, whereas a “cool roof” is viable
in Miami and Houston. 18 In colder climes with signiﬁcant heating re-
quirements, the latter in fact delivers a penalty. For example, in a stan-
dardized Boston home, a programmable thermostat generates annual
savings of $364 for an additional cost of just $85, reducing duct sealing
leakage to 6% delivers a sizeable yearly savings of $468 for a total cost
of $890, but a cool roof delivers negative savings of $25 for an additional
cost of $186. In Miami, however, a cool roof for the same cost generates
positive savings of $74 annually.
Table 8 shows costs and yearly savings for selected energy efﬁciency
upgrades for the ﬁve cities. While the costs are assumed to be the same
across cities in this model, the savings differ by climate related usage.
Looking at savings relative to total costs, it is evident that there are
signiﬁcant opportunities in these upgrades. New appliances and im-
proved sealing and insulation, however, involve sizeable expenditures,
so ﬁnancing availability and costs could become a signiﬁcant factor.
Our next section deals with this potential barrier.17 We use a savings–cost ratio as a simple indicator of the ﬁnancial viability and relative
speed at which the homeowner would recoup costs. This was calculated by the authors.
The HES model provides measures of payback time and return on investment, but those
require additional assumptions. As a comparative measure and a simple heuristic, we
chose the ratio approach.
18 A cool roof has high solar reﬂectance thereby reducing heat transfer to a building. At
the same time it has high thermal emittance, i.e., it radiates absorbed energy.4.5. Benchmarking solar photovoltaic systems
Solar photovoltaic (PV) systems are currently the predominant way
of providing renewable energy to both residential and commercial
property owners in the U.S. A successfully installed Solar PV system
will produce electricity (kWh) and re-sell it to a utility ($/kWh) that
provides local electrical distribution at speciﬁed rates. Customers have
a variety of methods to pay for the large up-front costs of purchasing
and installing a Solar PV renewable energy system. Two key differences
between the energy retroﬁtmarkets described in the preceding sections
and the Solar PV market are that the energy production (in kWh) for
each PV module can be measured exactly and the cost of installation
can be much more uniformly measured and priced for consumers. The
availability of standardized metrics in the Solar PV market versus the
lack of such metrics in the rest of the energy retroﬁt market has created
important differences in their relative market success.
5. Financing energy-saving investments
Given the 19% annual IRR on residential energy-saving investments
estimated by the McKinsey and Company (2009a) study discussed earli-
er, it might seem that ﬁnancing would generally not impede projects, as
long as the annual borrowing costs were below that high level.19 Howev-
er, there are at least ﬁve reasons why ﬁnancing terms may still impede
energy-saving investments20:
1) Property owners with weak credit records may have no access to
loan markets at all.
2) Non-interest rate loan terms, such as short maturities, may be unac-
ceptable to borrowers.
3) McKinsey's 19% IRR is an average over all residential projects, so a
signiﬁcant percentage of the available projects will have lower IRRs
and thus will require ﬁnancing costs below, possibly well below,
19% if they were to proceed.
4) Property owners are likely to be risk averse in evaluating energy-
saving investments, and would thus require borrowing costs
below the IRR before they will make the investment. “Ambiguity
aversion”—reﬂecting uncertainty over the distribution of project
returns—would require a still lower borrowing rate.
5) Property owners face a large number of “transaction costs,” includ-
ing the time and expense to ﬁnd and monitor contractors and
arrange the ﬁnancing. The interest cost of borrowing must be low
enough to offset these costs.
It is thus plausible that borrowing costs in the single-digit range will
be essential if property owners are to carry out a signiﬁcant volume of
energy-saving investments. Putting aside government subsidized loans,
borrowing rates this low can generally be achieved only with secured
loans, or with special loan contracts that allow the property owner to
make a highly credible commitment to repay the loan.
The immediate question is thus how to ﬁnance energy-saving
investments with secured loans or with comparable loan contract fea-
tures. For newly constructed homes, the ﬁnancing of energy-saving
investments is generally not a problem because the costs of such invest-
ments are embedded in the home purchase price and thus are automat-
ically included in the mortgage amount. The FHA and VA also offer19 This assumes that funding is available for the samematurity as the energy-saving ben-
eﬁts and that the time pattern of the loan payments and savings are compatible.
20 This is not to say that providing adequate ﬁnancing mechanisms would immediately
and necessarily create the full range of energy-saving residential investments, such as pro-
posed in McKinsey and Company (2009a), to be carried out. As we have indicated in the
previous section, a wide range of informational issues also have to be solved. The limita-
tions of ﬁnancing as “the” solution to expedite energy-saving investments are discussed
more fully in Borgeson et al. (2012).
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qualifying payment-to-income ratios on homes that are certiﬁed as
energy-efﬁcient through a program such as Energy Star. Table 2,
discussed earlier, conﬁrms that new homes have steadily incorporated
more effective energy-saving technologies over time.
In contrast, the mortgage market is not this accommodating to
owners of older existing homes. It is possible to reﬁnance an existing
mortgage and add the energy-saving investment cost to the loan bal-
ance in the fashion of a cash-out reﬁnancing. However, this requires
that the property appraisal reﬂects the value of the investment or that
the property owner otherwise has sufﬁcient excess equity in the home
to meet the standards for a larger mortgage. Furthermore, signiﬁcant
ﬁxed transaction costs are associated with mortgage reﬁnancings, so
reﬁnancing solely for the purpose of funding an energy-saving invest-
ment is unlikely to be economic. To be sure, savvy property owners
may ﬁnd opportunities to carry out energy-saving investments at the
same time they are reﬁnancing a mortgage due to falling interest
rates. In addition, FannieMae now offers an Energy ImprovementMort-
gage that allows the costs of certiﬁed energy-saving investments to be
included in a new mortgage at the time of an existing home purchase.
Nevertheless, in the absence of government subsidies, it appears that
ﬁrst-lien mortgages will not be a dependable source of funding for the
large number of existing homes that require energy-saving retroﬁts.
Brown (2009) and Fuller (2009) both come to a similar conclusion.
Home equity loans or other forms of second mortgages provide
another instrument through which property owners may use a secured
mortgage to fund energy-saving investments. Indeed, such loans pro-
vide the funding for many types of home improvement projects. How-
ever, the interest rates on such loans will necessarily be higher than
on primary mortgages, reﬂecting the junior status of the second lien.
The borrowing rate will be higher still for property owners with less
than sterling credit ratings, assuming the loan is available at all. Finally,
property owners must have sufﬁcient equity—property value in excess
of theﬁrstmortgage balance—for lenders to consider a secondmortgage
loan. Indeed, this is a requirement on the new FHA 2nd mortgage pro-
gram, called PowerSaver, which is in themidst of a two-year trial. Over-
all, given the current state of depressed house prices in the United
States, it appears that 2nd mortgage programs also will not soon be a
dependable source of funding energy-saving investments.
Fortunately, these limitations of standard mortgage instruments—
either as ﬁrst or second liens—have been well recognized, and a variety
of new loan mechanisms have been developed to fund energy-saving
investments. To various extents, they also deal with some of the under-
lying theoretical issues in economics and ﬁnance mentioned above—
such as credit rationing, the heterogeneity of credit constrained
borrowers, the risk averse nature of most borrowers, the difﬁculty of
scaling-up, and high transaction costs, all of which result in higher bor-
rowing rates and hence much lower investments in energy efﬁciency
projects. In broad categories, the new loan mechanisms are energy
purchase contracts, on-utility-bill loans, and on-property-tax-bill loans.
We now discuss these in turn.
5.1. Energy purchase contracts
Energy purchase contracts have the common feature that a third party
generallymakes the investment decision and covers the capital costs. The
property owner then compensates the third party, the form of this com-
pensation differentiating the various plans.21 Energy purchase contracts,
however, have the drawback that they must reach a sufﬁcient size to be
cost effective, which has limited their current use; see Fuller (2009).
Solar installations are one area to date in which such contracts have
been applied in homes; see Section 5.4 below.21 See Larsen et al. (2012) for a full discussion of energy purchase contracts andof the en-
ergy service companies that provide them.5.2. On-utility-bill ﬁnancing and repayment plans
On-utility-bill (hereafter just On-Bill) plans come in two basic varie-
ties. On-Bill ﬁnancing plans require the public utility itself to provide the
capital for the loan ﬁnancing. On-Bill repayment plans raise the capital
for loan ﬁnancing from third parties, although the utility still collects
the loan payments. In both cases, the key feature is that the property
owner commits to make payments on a loan for an energy-saving
investment in tandem with the standard utility bill payments for ener-
gy.22 Partial paymentsmay be prorated across the loan and energy com-
ponents, and the utility may commit to apply its standard collection
methods, including turning off the power if the property owner should
become sufﬁciently delinquent. If the property is sold, the loan payment
obligation generally transfers to the new owner, although there may be
options for the seller to prepay the full loan at that time. Overall, On-Bill
plans are a signiﬁcant step forward in allowing the property owner to
make a credible commitment to repay the loan.
A particularly attractive feature of On-Bill plans is the potential
for bill neutrality, meaning that the total utility bill remains the
same or falls because the reduction in energy costs equals or exceeds
the loan payments. Bill neutrality cannot be guaranteed, however,
because property residents may well opt for a more comfortable en-
vironment, for example by maintaining the home at a cooler level
during a hot summer due to the more efﬁcient system. This
“rebound” factor is sometimes considered a negative dimension of
energy-saving investments, but this is incorrect. When the cost of
any good falls, consumers always have the choice of distributing
the cost savings over all of their consumption expenditures (the
“income effect” in microeconomic theory) and/or consuming more
of the particular good (the “substitution effect” in microeconomic
theory). The substitution effect—keeping a home more comfortable
when the cost of doing so has fallen—is properly considered a beneﬁt
of the success of the energy-saving investment.
There are, of course, potential pitfalls to On-Bill payment plans, three
of which are:
• The penalty of turning off a household's power if it defaults on its loan
maybe considered too harsh. State consumer protection lawsmay not
allow it, and in any case utility companies and public utility commis-
sion may be reluctant to receive the adverse publicity.
• The transfer of the repayment obligation to a new owner upon sale of
a property may also face legal impediments. The plansmust therefore
be carefully crafted in this regard.
• Public utility funding for On-Bill programs is limited, and greater use
of these repayment plans will be essential if the concept is going to
reach a signiﬁcant scale.
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) has become a major advo-
cate of On-Bill repayment plans as a means to substitute private capital
for public-utility funding. Copithorne and Fine (2011), from EDF point
out further advantages of On-Bill repayment plans including the poten-
tial to provide:
a) longer term loans, thus better matching the life of the energy-saving
in investment;
b) relatively low interest rates, assuming the experience of low default
rates continues;
c) customization for individual multifamily units, thus avoiding the
split incentive problem.22 In some states, it may be important to state the payments as part of an energy tariff,
and not explicitly as loan payments, for otherwise the utility might become subject to re-
strictive regulations as a lender.
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Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) plans provide an alternative
mechanism through which the property owner can make a credible
commitment to repay the loan. The key here is that the loan payment
obligations become part of the property tax bill, and the property
owner commits tomake the loan payments in tandemwith the standard
property taxes. Partial paymentsmay be prorated across the loan and tax
components, and the municipality may commit to apply its standard
collection methods, including foreclosure on the property if the owner
becomes sufﬁciently delinquent; see Zimring and Fuller (2010) for-0.50
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Fig. 7.A. Boston: Savings to additional cost ratios. B. Denver: Savings to additional cost ratios. C.
Francisco: Savings to additional cost ratios.other options if payments become delinquent. If the property is sold,
the loan payment obligation transfers to the new owner, although there
may be options for the seller to prepay the full loan at that time; see
Coughlin et al. (2010) for a more complete discussion of transferring
PACE assessments.
PACE plans are created by a local government unit—typically a coun-
ty or municipality—which sets the detailed terms and conditions and
provides the initial capital for the loans. All PACE plans include require-
ments to ensure that the expected present value of the savings exceeds
the present value cost of the energy-saving investments. Under this
condition, the investment is productive and it would be expected that-0.20
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Houston: Savings to additional cost ratios. D.Miami: Savings to additional cost ratios. E. San
Table 8
Costs and savings (in $) from selected energy efﬁciency upgrades.
Clothes washera Gas water heatera Gas dryera Air sealingb Duct sealingc
Assumed Cost =N 90 180 340 850 890
Boston Yearly savings 39 55 83 299 468
Savings/cost 0.43 0.31 0.24 0.35 0.53
Denver Yearly savings 31 31 50 125 240
Savings/cost 0.34 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.27
Houston Yearly savings 31 30 62 74 115
Savings/cost 0.34 0.17 0.18 0.09 0.13
Miami Yearly savings 33 43 94 29 95
Savings/cost 0.37 0.24 0.28 0.03 0.11
San Francisco Yearly savings 36 35 63 87 87
Savings/cost 0.40 0.19 0.19 0.10 0.10
a Implies switching to energy star clothes washer, premium efﬁciency water heater, or to a gas dryer from electric dryer.
b Air sealing involves reduction in air leakage of 25%; costs are total, not additional.
c Duct sealing involves reducing leakage to 6% of total air ﬂow; costs are total, not additional.
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Furthermore, loan payments could be organized so that the energy sav-
ings equal or exceed the loan payment obligation, a version of bill neu-
trality. This should provide alignment of the interests of all the involved
stakeholders:
1) Property owners have every incentive to ensure that the beneﬁts ex-
ceed the costs as they make the investment and take on the obliga-
tion to repay the loan.
2) Sponsoring local governments will recognize that PACE obligations
are parallel with their own property tax receipts, and for this reason
PACE programs generally impose requirements to ensure the invest-
ments are productive.23
3) PACE loan payments will generally be sold by the municipality to
third-party investors. These investors must expect the investments
to be productive and the loans to be repaid. This force will become
even more active if programs such as WHEEL succeed in securitizing
PACE loans; see National Association for State EnergyOfﬁcials (2012).
In summary, the incentives of the three participants in a PACE
program are fully aligned to insure the projects are productive and the
loans will be repaid.
PACE plans can be applied to either residential or commercial proper-
ty. By 2010, a number of PACE programs, both commercial and residen-
tial, had started and appeared to be successful on ﬁrst look. However, in
a Directive of February 28, 2011, the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) directed FannieMae and FreddieMac (hereafter the Government
Sponsored Enterprises, GSEs) “not to purchase mortgages affected by
ﬁrst-lien PACE obligations.” This reiterated an earlier FHFA Statement of
July 6, 2010 directing the GSEs to “limit their exposure to ﬁnancial risks
associated with ﬁrst-lien PACE programs.” The FHFA concern was that a
PACE lien has priority over a ﬁrst-mortgage lien, and in the case of a fore-
closure initiated by a GSE, it was possible that the GSE recovery would be
reduced by the amount of the PACE lien. On this basis, the FHFA conclud-
ed that the PACE programs present a signiﬁcant risk to the safety and
soundness of the GSEs.
Not surprisingly, legal objections were ﬁled against the FHFA pol-
icy. As a result, the FHFA reopened the discussion period and offered
three alternative means of mitigating the ﬁnancial risks that it be-
lieves PACE programs pose for the GSEs.24 Alternatives 1 and 223 The need to require productive investments is also reinforced by local government
concern that the ratings on their municipal bonds could fall were the rating agencies
and bond investors to come to believe that the PACE programswere raising the likelihood
of a municipal bond default.
24 The three FHFA alternatives are provided in Federal Housing Finance Agency (2012).
The discussion in the remainder of this section is based on Jaffee (2012), a comment of-
fered to the FHFA concerning their proposal and alternatives.impose conditions that effectively require that PACE loans be risk-
free, an underwriting standard the FHFA and GSEs obviously do not
follow in their main business of providing guarantees against mort-
gage defaults. Enacting these alternatives would effectively prohibit
PACE programs. Alternative 3 is more feasible and the comments of a
number of existing PACE programs indicate they believe they could
operate within the requirements of this alternative. Key features of
Alternative 3 include25:
• The property owner is current on the mortgage and has suffered not
more than one instance of mortgage payment delinquency over the
past three years.
• The PACE investment is validated in an audit or feasibility study
performed by a certiﬁcated contractor under a program such as
HERS (see discussion above), which conﬁrms that the total energy
and water cost savings are expected to exceed the total investment
cost.
• The total amount of PACE assessments for a property shall not exceed
10% of the appraised property value and the property owner shall
have equity in the property of not less than 15%of the appraised value.
• The maximum term of the PACE assessment shall be no longer than
the expected useful life of the PACE improvements.
At this writing, we are waiting for the FHFA decision.
As an innovative program for energy-saving loans, there is no doubt
that PACE programs will evolve into more productive forms, and the
GSEs and FHFA can play an important and constructive role in encourag-
ing such improvements. Perhaps most importantly, by allowing PACE
loans to be made on properties with GSE-guaranteed mortgages, more
datawill become available and research can investigate the speciﬁc con-
ditions that could be included within PACE programs to ensure that the
loans are as productive as possible.
5.4. Financing mechanisms for Solar PV
Solar PVs are a distinct subset of energy efﬁciency investments, both
operationally and in terms of their ﬁnancing. A solar installation is not a
replacement; it is a new installation and it has standardized metrics in
terms of the costs per square foot for equipment and installation, and
howmuchelectricity the installationwill generate. The threemost com-
mon mechanisms used to ﬁnance Solar PV systems are cash payments,
Solar Power Purchase Agreements (PPA), and Solar Leases. Solar PPAs
and Solar Leases are especially popular ﬁnancing mechanisms because
Solar PV systems allow for clearly measureable relative costs and25 The full details of the FHFA Alternative 3 cover almost a full page of the Federal Regis-
ter and include 29 separate paragraphs and sub-paragraphs.
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return to investors. PPAs and Solar Leases are usually combinedwith the
Federal Renewable Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC) program, and
have thus provided a key source of funding for the rapid growth of the
Solar PV system market over the past several years.26
Cash payment is made by the property owner to the solar installation
company to pay for the purchase and installation of a Solar PV system.
The property owner becomes the owner of the Solar PV system and
thus is eligible for receiving all Federal (30%), state (up to 20%), utility,
and other local solar grants (1–10%). In this structure, the property
owner owns and maintains the Solar PV system via independent solar
contracting companies who are paid on an “as needed” basis.
The Solar Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) is an unsecured agree-
ment to purchase the electrical power produced from an installed
Solar PV system on an individual property. With a PPA, the price per
kWh that the customer pays is set in a negotiated 5–20 year agreement
upfront. The PPA often allows the customer to purchase the system after
ﬁve years and includes a locked in “spread” between the current and
contracted utility rates. This measure determines the amount that the
customer will pay the solar ﬁnance company per kWh produced.
The Solar Lease is an unsecured lease agreement used by property
owners to use a Solar PV system to reduce their electricity costs for a
term of ﬁve to twenty years. The periodic payment of the lease is a
ﬁxed amount that is negotiated between the ﬁnance/installation com-
pany and the property owner. This payment is ﬁxed for at least ﬁve of
the ten to twenty year term of the lease and may include escalations
for inﬂation increases, as well as ﬁxed-term step-up payments over
the Solar Lease term. The amount of energy savings to the customer is
often guaranteed as a form of security for the customer engaging in a
long term Solar Lease. Upon expiration of a solar lease, the customer
has three basic options: renew the Solar Lease period; upgrade to a
new Solar PV system with a new lease; or remove the Solar PV system
from the property and return it to the solar ﬁnance company.
In both non-cash ﬁnancing cases, the ﬁnancing company agrees to
maintain and often monitor the installed PV system. Since these mech-
anisms have full recourse to the customer, they require a FICO score of
700 or greater. The options upon property transfer during a Solar
Lease or PPA are: 1) Pay the remaining amount owed on the lease or
PPA; 2) Pay to physically move the PV system to a new property and
continue the lease or PPA obligations according to the original lease
with possible adjustments based on the location of new property;
3) Negotiate to have the new property owner assume the existing
obligations under the current PPA or Solar Lease.27
Despite the long term ﬁnancial obligations for customers, non-cash
methods are currently the most widely accepted methods for ﬁnancing
the cost of purchasing and installing a renewable energy Solar PV sys-
tem. In California, 72.4% of all new PV installations from Jan–May 2012
were paid via a third party ﬁnancial mechanism such as a Solar PPA or
Solar Lease, up from 45.6% during the same period in 2011.28 These
ﬁnancial products are scalable, measureable, and thus available for
securitization.
The key difference between energy retroﬁts and Solar PV is that the
cost parameters for the latter are clearly delineated and the beneﬁts, in
the form of electricity generation. In short, two key impediments which
are present in retroﬁts—incomplete information and heterogeneity—are
absent. On the issue of ﬁnancing, it may also be the ability to reduce
both risk and transaction costs to the homeowner by funneling costs
and savings through the solar provider that clinches the deal.26 See, Bloomberg New Energy Finance — Ted Hesser, Senior Market Analyst, Presenta-
tion on Renewable Energy.
27 Industry Interview— Chris Pawlik, Co-Founder of Energy-Producing Retail Realty, Inc.
www.eprsquared.com.
28 Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efﬁciency — http://www.dsireusa.
org/incentives/homeowner.cfm?state=CA&re=1&ee=1.5.4.1. The role of federal tax credits
The federal government has extended the solar investment tax credit
(ITC) which allows for a 30% tax credit in the form of a tax rebate once a
Solar PV system has been installed on a roof. It previously was limited to
$2000 per home, but that cap was lifted in 2009 and the term of the bill
was extended to 2016. Solar investments also receive an accelerated de-
preciation tax beneﬁt. Private equity funds create pools of the tax beneﬁts,
which are now also being securitized. Currently, ITC subsidy funds are
needed tomake these projectswork for both the end consumer (property
owner) and the various entities along the Solar PV delivery chain.
Since the tax credit investor's equity in the PV project goes to zero
over the thirty-year tax credit agreement, the risks for tax credit inves-
tors associated with investing in these funds lie in twomain categories:
collateral risk and ownership risk. Collateral risk arises if the lien associ-
ated with funding the Solar PV system goes into default, so that the
equity status of the investor is lost alongwith the tax credit. Ownership
risk is associated with a ﬁve year recapture period when tax credits can
be recaptured if the investor is deemed to lack sufﬁcient ownership in
the PV system.
Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) investors are also a major
source of Solar ITC funding. The credit is based on a simultaneous 30%
equity investment with a thirty-year depletion model similar to the
ten-year LIHTC depletion model for low-income housing credits.
The remaining 70% of the project must be funded from sources that
commonly include homeowner equity, bank loans, local government
credits, and credits from the solar manufacturers and installers.
5.4.2. Makers Depreciation funds
Makers Depreciation funds are an additional income tax reduction
tool created by the 2008 federal ﬁnancial relief package and sold by
solar ﬁnancing companies to ﬁnance their projects.29 The depreciation
credits for the installed solar system are sold to proﬁtable businesses
looking to reduce income tax exposure, often the same ITC investors.
It is believed that Makers Depreciation represents the third largest
source of equity ﬁnancing (23%) for a new PV project after the Federal
(ITC) portion (30%) and working capital requirements of the ﬁnance
and/or installation company (approximately 28%.)
5.4.3. Secured mortgage liens
Secured mortgage liens provide the same potential for funding solar
investments as other energy-saving investments. The methodology for
secured ﬁnancing for Solar PV is that a lender willing and able to
acknowledge the value of the cost reducing improvements of an energy
retroﬁt through an increased appraised value or increased disposable
income will allow the borrower to service the additional debt. Unfortu-
nately, as discussed above, secured mortgage liens—both ﬁrst and sec-
ond liens—remain more a future hope than a current reality, despite
the greater ease of measuring Solar PV costs and beneﬁts.
5.5. Summary of ﬁnancing mechanisms
Given the relatively large size and long duration of beneﬁts from
energy-saving investments, it is understandable that accessible ﬁnanc-
ing is a necessary condition to carry out these investments on a large
scale. Since the investments are intrinsically connected to a home,
lenders could treat the associated loans as secured credits. Lenders
have been slow, however, to create such secured “energy mortgages”,
although some pilot programs are in process. As a result, alternative
mechanisms have been developed to obtain ﬁnancing through public
utilities (on-utility-bill ﬁnancing) or through local governments (Prop-
erty Accessed Clean Energy, PACE). Unfortunately, the public utility29 Greentech Media Article on Solar Strong program, available at: https://www.
greentechmedia.com/articles/read/solarcitys-solarstrong-to-move-more-bank-money-into-
military-housing/.
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tions, while the PACE programs currently face stiff resistance from
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The provision of ﬁnancing for Solar PV has been more successful, and
thus provides a useful case study. Two key components appear responsi-
ble for the success of Solar PV: (1) clear metrics for the costs and beneﬁts
of a solar investment; (2) government tax beneﬁts that have allowed the
industry to reach an effective scale. A key result is that most solar instal-
lations are funded through third parties connected directly or indirectly
with the installation. Unfortunately, government tax beneﬁts for general
energy-saving investments do not appear to be on the horizon. Thus, in
line with the discussion in Section 4 of this paper, clear metrics for the
costs and beneﬁts of general energy-saving investments remains a critical
ﬁrst step to improve the mechanisms available for their funding.
6. Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we review the possible market failures that could
create the large under-investment in productive energy-saving projects
documented in McKinsey and Company (2009a).30 We focus on two
major categories: imperfect information and loan market inefﬁciency.
Imperfect information is a plausible bottleneck for energy-saving
investments because the production function that generates the costs
and beneﬁts of housing services is intrinsically complex and no doubt
opaque to most property owners. Given the high costs to acquire the
necessary information, it is not surprising that productive energy-
saving investments are not carried out.
Regarding loan markets, it would appear that ﬁnancially productive
investments embedded in real estate structures should serve as collat-
eral for secured loans, and the loans should thereby receive appropri-
ately low interest rates. In practice, however, private market lenders
generally do not consider energy-saving investments to be collateral
for a secured loan, and property owners of existing residential proper-
ties generally face relatively high borrowing costs to ﬁnance energy-
saving investments. Thus, the loan market failure is also fundamentally
informational, in that lenders appear unconvinced that the investments
will dependably increase house values.
A primary conclusion of this paper is that the informational
imperfections relating to energy-saving investments are sufﬁciently se-
vere to deter the investments for both demand and supply reasons. On
the demand side, the information imperfections may plausibly and sig-
niﬁcantly limit the effective demand of property owners to carry out
such investments. On the supply side, imperfections may severely
limit access to secured loans to ﬁnance the investments that property
owners do desire to carry out. Given the potential for information im-
perfections to deter energy-saving investments, the key remaining
question concerns possible policy solutions for these market failures.
As emphasized in the text of this paper, computer-based tools that
either score the relative efﬁciency of a home or assess the productivity
of alternative energy-saving investments have a great potential to
resolve the current informational imperfections. Unfortunately, this po-
tential has not been realized to date. This can be seen ﬁrst from the
limited success of the existing tools in promoting energy-saving invest-
ments, and second from our analysis which reveals signiﬁcant and con-
tinuing shortfalls in both tool accuracy and accessibility. Nevertheless,
we believe that such tools have the potential to eliminate a signiﬁcant
part of the current informational imperfections. We are thus strong
advocates for the continuing development of these tools. Government
funding is a key element of this development because it encourages
transparency, an important aspect of tool credibility. Furthermore, in
order for themodels to better anticipate the actual behavior of residents30 To be clear, we focus in this study on the failure of private agents to carry out appar-
ently productive investments. Energy-saving investments may also be motivated by the
negative externalities of energy-based environmental pollution, but that issue is beyond
the scope of this paper.and property owners, we advocate expanding surveys and randomized
controlled experiments.
We believe that the development of reliable tools to evaluate the
productivity of energy-saving investments will also provide signiﬁcant
beneﬁts in promoting access to secured loans to fund these invest-
ments. As discussed in the text, the loan market innovations of On-Bill
ﬁnancing and repayment programs and PACEprograms have signiﬁcant
potential to expand loan market access for borrowers making energy-
saving investments. The relative success of Solar PV installations
appears related in part to the availability of clear metrics to evaluate
the costs and beneﬁts.
While improved tools are clearly part of the answer, a number of
issues remain. The heterogeneity of customersmeans that amultiplicity
of tools may be appropriate, so that the various groups of individuals,
contractors, and investors can choose the most useful tool to make
their investment decisions. As Palmer et al. (2012, 2013) point out,
while both informational and ﬁnancing issues are clearly important,
little data exist to identify the speciﬁc participants in various programs
and their behavioral idiosyncrasies, or to make comparisons between
participants and control groups of non-adopters and non-participants.
Although we expect the forthcoming development of improved
assessment tools and loan market mechanisms will substantially miti-
gate the bottlenecks that currently deter energy-saving investments,
we also recognize that the option to take no action may also contribute
to an important part of the observed inertia. It is interesting in this con-
text that there is an expanding recognition that consumers, over many
economic decisions, continue to operate in a sub-optimal fashion in the
absence of behavioral forces that “nudge” them to action; see Thaler and
Sunstein (2008). The relevance is that the motivation to carry out
energy-saving investments may be substantially enhanced at certain
key decision points.
For example, the failure of a heating or cooling system or a water
heater requires immediate action, creating a strong nudge to make the
energy-saving investment. The success of the Energy Star ratings for
appliances and HVAC units, from the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (2012), illustrates the beneﬁt of such “nudge” programs. Home
sales may also create the nudge to carry out energy-saving investments,
since homeowners commonly carry out a variety of home repairs at the
time of sale, including repairs required by local governments for certiﬁ-
cation at the time of sale. The sale event might also provide opportunity
for disclosures about energy usage in a standardized format that will
help homebuyers make more informed decisions. For a more complete
discussion of the potential to nudge action, see Bamberger (2012).
There may also be an entrepreneurial opportunity for third-party busi-
nesses to realize scale by providing an integrated service that combines
a trusted brand and ﬁnancing access, similar to the existing programs
for solar installations.
In closing, we note that there may be an important but distinct role
for government subsidies in expediting energy-saving investments.
Here we agree with Allcott and Greenstone (2012) that subsidies are
the proper instrument to mitigate the negative externalities of energy
use that arise from, say, environmental pollution. However, for the
informational and loan market failures that are the focus of this paper,
theﬁrst-best solution is toﬁx the problemsdirectly. In that spirit, we be-
lieve the actions proposed here to mitigate directly the recognized bot-
tlenecks are the proper path for expanding the volume of energy-saving
investments.
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